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Abstract
The current social media landscape has resulted in a situation where people are encouraged to share a greater 
amount of information about their day-to-day lives than ever before.  In this environment a large amount of 
personal data is disclosed in a public forum with little to no regard for the potential privacy impacts.  This paper 
focuses on the presence of geographic data within images, metadata and individual postings.  The 
GeoIntelligence project aims to aggregate this information to educate users on the possible implications of the 
utilisation of these services as well as providing service to law enforcement and business.  This paper 
demonstrates the ability to profile users on an individual and group basis from data posted openly to social 
networking services. 
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INTRODUCTION
The widespread implementation of technologies such as GPS, A-GPS and other location based services in 
smartphones, cameras and portable music players has resulted in a plethora of location-aware devices.  This 
functionality has been utilised by numerous developers in applications and services that go well beyond the 
domains that typical users expect to be location-aware (Junglas and Watson 2008).  While most users 
understand that mapping and navigation programs require location-awareness, they may not realise that said 
capabilities are utilised in some games, social networking applications, camera functionality and numerous other 
applications and services (Wagner, Lopez et al. 2010). 
The proliferation of locational data in publically available information has been encouraged largely by social 
media services such as Facebook, Google+, Twitter, Flickr and Foursquare.  Such services allow users to share 
information in the form of text, images and videos.  Although the availability of the information can be 
controlled, a significant proportion of users across these services make it public – either through choice, apathy 
or ignorance (Lindqvist, Cranshaw et al. 2011).  A concept known as “geotagging” allows for the user’s 
locational data to be published as metadata alongside the information being shared.  This paper investigates the 
scope of locational data provided via such services – the feasibility of mining the data and the importance of 
raising awareness of the quantity of data available via these services (Freni, Vicente et al. 2010; Elwood and 
Leszczynski 2011; Lindqvist, Cranshaw et al. 2011). 
HOW GEOTAGGING WORKS 
The concept of geotagging originated in high-end digital cameras, with integrated or peripheral-based GPS 
receivers allowing them to encode locational data in image files created with the camera.  The mid-2000s saw 
smartphones with integrated cameras and location-awareness features reach maturity, and the geotagging of 
images taken on such devices became commonplace.  Modern social media services make use of locational data 
in images and also utilise browser and operating system-based techniques to geotag user-submitted content.  
Details of how geotagging is implemented in these systems are presented below. 
Geotagging of Images 
Locational data in images is typically stored as metadata in Exchangeable Image File Format (EXIF) – the 
standard format used to store metadata in image files taken using a digital camera.  EXIF data is stored as a 
series of tags and associated values in the header of an image file.  Common tags include the make and model of 
the camera and various camera settings such as exposure time and focal length.  The EXIF data can also contain 
information that uniquely identifies the device that has taken the image (JEITA 2002).  Tags for locational data 
include latitude, longitude and altitude.  This information can be populated at image creation time when using a 
location-aware device, or added manually at a later date.  Adding locational EXIF data to an image post-creation 
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typically involves using software to correlate timestamps of images with timestamps in the log of a GPS 
receiver carried with the camera while pictures are taken.  EXIF data can be read and utilised by various 
applications, services and programming languages. 
While an increasing number of digital cameras are location-aware, smartphones are currently the most common 
locational-aware devices with camera capabilities – a trend which shows no sign of abating in the foreseeable 
future.  The iPhone, Android and Windows Phone 7 platforms have support for geotagging of images included 
by default in the operating system.  Geotagging is disabled by default on the iPhone and Windows Phone 7 
devices, however the user will be prompted to enable the feature upon first launch of the camera application 
(Figures 1) (Valli and Hannay 2010).   
 
  
Figure 1 – iPhone (left) and Windows Phone 7 (right) camera location permission prompts 
Geotagging is also disabled by default on Android devices, and must be manually enabled in the camera settings 
(Figure 3).  Similar scenarios exist in other smartphone operating systems such as those of Palm and Blackberry 
devices.  Although geotagging is disabled by default on most platforms, it is likely that users will enable the 
feature without considering its implications (Friedland and Sommer 2010). 
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Figure 3 – Geotagging settings for Android 
Geotagging in Facebook 
Facebook is currently the dominant social networking platform, allowing users to share textual and multimedia 
content with others.  In August of 2010, Facebook introduced a feature named “Places” that allows users to 
“check in” when using Facebook from a location-aware device such as a smartphone.  When a user checks in, 
they are presented with a list of nearby user-defined places based on their current location.  The user selects (or 
creates) the appropriate place and optionally describes what they are doing to complete the check in (Facebook 
2011). 
By default, Facebook’s privacy settings only make this information available to members of the user’s friend 
list.  This, and the obfuscation of precise locational data via user-defined places, minimises the public disclosure 
of locational data via Facebook.  Locational data is not included in images or video uploaded to Facebook. 
Geotagging in Google+ 
Google+ is a social networking platform in beta at the time of writing, offering similar features to Facebook.  
All posts made to Google+ can be geotagged, and this is achieved using the W3C’s Geolocation API: 
The Geolocation API defines a high-level interface to location information associated only with the 
device hosting the implementation, such as latitude and longitude. The API itself is agnostic of the 
underlying location information sources. Common sources of location information include Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and location inferred from network signals such as IP address, RFID, WiFi 
and Bluetooth MAC addresses, and GSM/CDMA cell IDs, as well as user input. 
(W3C 2010) 
Hence, while a geotagged post from a desktop computer with no wireless capability may determine a coarse 
location via the user’s IP address (this technique is prone to error), a geotagged post from a smartphone with 
GPS capabilities will likely result in much more accurate locational data (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 – An example of locational information being included in a Google+ post 
 
Google+ also supports geotagged images via locational EXIF data, however this feature is disabled by default 
and must be manually enabled (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 – Examples of geotagged data from Google+ (left) and permissions (right) 
 
Similar to Facebook, posts made in Google+ are not disclosed publically by default. 
Geotagging in Twitter 
Twitter is a “micro-blogging” service that allows users to make short text-based posts.  Posts can be restricted so 
that only the users who “follow” the poster can view them; however the default settings make all posts public.  
In November of 2009, Twitter added the ability to include locational data in posts.  This data can be viewed by 
anyone who is able to access the post, as shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 – An example of a geotagged twitter posting via the web interface 
Location-inclusive Twitter posts include either a “Place ID” referring to a human-recognisable location or the 
user’s current latitude and longitude at the time of posting (Twitter 2011).  While posts made via the Twitter 
website utilise the user’s IP address to determine a coarse location, there are numerous Twitter client 
applications available for all smartphone platforms that use GPS and A-GPS to provide precise location data. 
The default Twitter account settings do not enable the geotagging of posts, and most client applications on 
smartphones maintain this.  As well as enabling the feature for all posts, individual posts can be geotagged. 
Geotagging in Flickr 
Flickr is a popular example of one of many photo-sharing websites, allowing users to upload images which can 
be viewed either by a restricted group of people or made publically available.  Flickr uses EXIF data in 
uploaded images to provide locational information.  The default, and recommended, settings are to include 
locational data and make all content publically available (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7 – Locational permissions settings for Flickr 
 
Users can control the presence and availability of locational data on a per-picture basis.  When viewing an 
image on the Flickr website, locational data (and other EXIF data) can be viewed and the location can be plotted 
on a map (Figure 8) (Flickr 2011). 
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Figure 8 – Example of a geotagged image in Flickr as seen via the web interface 
Geotagging in FourSquare 
FourSquare is a location-based service available on mobile devices such as smartphones.  Similar to (but pre-
dating) Facebook’s “Places” feature, it allows users to check in at their current location in order to announce 
their presence and share short textual information. 
While check ins are to user-defined places, the data submitted to FourSquare includes the user’s latitude and 
longitude.  The visibility of check ins can be limited to the user’s friend list, but are public by default.  The 
latitude and longitude submitted in a check in is also publically available via the FourSquare API (Figure 9) 
(FourSquare 2011). 
 
Figure 9 – Output from the FourSquare API showing latitude and longitude. 
FourSquare offers the ability to link a user’s FourSquare and Twitter accounts – automatically posting details of 
a check in to Twitter.  Many users make use of this feature, substantially increasing the number of geotagged 
Twitter posts. 
While there are numerous other services and websites that make use of geotagged content, the examples 
discussed above present an appropriate overview of the current situation.  Although some services such as 
Facebook and Google+ do not share geotagged information by default, other services do. With each of the 
discussed services boasting over ten million users, there is a large amount of publically available geotagged 
social media content (Sorathia and Joshi 2009). 
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INTRODUCING GEOINTELLIGENCE 
The concept of “GeoIntelligence” is simple: Mining publically available geotagged social media content.  By 
aggregating the content and its associated locational data, a plethora of information can be deduced.  The data 
can be analysed from numerous perspectives including time, location, user and keyword.  Combinations of these 
are also possible, for example identifying users who were within 50km of a particular incident or event within a 
certain timeframe of the same. 
Obtaining geotagged social media content in a mineable format not particularly onerous thanks to the APIs 
available for developers to integrate with social media services.  This allows code to be written which retrieves 
content – including locational data – from the services, such as posts to Twitter and check ins to FourSquare.  
Retrieving this data is standard functionality in the API, and does not breach the terms of service. 
Social media service APIs present two main techniques for data mining.  One technique is to write code which 
makes queries to the service(s), attempting to find the desired information by searching the content stored by the 
service(s).  Although this technique is resource-light, it is problematic as limits are often imposed upon such 
queries by the API – often restricting the search criteria, frequency of searches and number of results.  The 
second technique involves the ongoing retrieval of all geotagged content from the service(s) and archiving of the 
data in a local database.  The database can then be queried without limitations.  Obviously, such an approach is 
very resource-heavy, requiring substantial amounts of bandwidth, storage and processing power.  Resource 
usage can be minimised if a relevant subset of the content can be identified, for example only retrieving and 
storing content from a certain region or timeframe.  Despite the resource usage, the second approach is 
favourable as it allows for limitless querying and makes it easier to combine data from different social media 
services. 
As a proof of concept, the authors created a web-based tool which autonomously collects all publically available 
geotagged Twitter posts.  The details of each post are stored in a database and include the textual content of the 
post, latitude and longitude, post time, poster’s username and provided real name and the name of the client 
application used to make the post.  The tool is written in the PHP scripting language and stores its content in a 
MySQL database.  A web-based interface allows users to see recently archived posts, view each post on a map, 
view the poster’s Twitter profile and view all geotagged posts by a user on a map (Figure 10).   
 
Figure 10 – A small fraction of the geotagged Twitter posts made by a particularly prolific user 
Searches can be performed to find posts by keyword, username and location, with all matching posts being 
displayed on a map.  All data displayed on maps is in Keyhole Markup Language (KML) format, an XML-
based format designed to express points of interest on maps (KML 2.2 SWG Group 2010).  Google Maps is 
used to display the KML data. 
While the tool in its current form represents a fairly basic implementation of GeoIntelligence, it has been able to 
demonstrate the concept’s potential. 
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POTENTIAL USES OF GEOINTELLIGENCE 
The authors have identified three main potential uses of GeoIntelligence, presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Potential uses of GeoIntelligence 
Potential Use Example of Use 
Law Enforcement 
Identify potential witnesses to an event by finding posts within a 
specific location and timeframe 
 
Identify or locate suspects by examining posts by certain users and 
determining a profile / daily routine 
Business Intelligence and Marketing 
Read posts and determine demographics of clientele who post from 
within a business 
 
Determine common interests and frequent locations of clientele who 
post from within a business 
Privacy Awareness and Education 
Demonstrate the ability to deduce personal information such as 
home address to raise awareness of the privacy implications of 
geotagging 
The usage examples provided are but a few of the potential applications of GeoIntelligence.  If a user regularly 
makes publically accessible geotagged posts, it can be a trivial task to identify details such as their home 
address, workplace, local shopping centre, hobbies and interests and their favourite bars and restaurants.  With 
further analysis, it is possible to plot a user’s daily routine and deduce where they are likely to be at a particular 
time. 
There exists the potential for such information to be used for malicious or nefarious purposes, for example 
stalking, harassment or burglary.   The potential for misuse of geotagged social media content was highlighted 
by the website “pleaserobme.com”, which utilised geotagged FourSquare and Twitter posts to advertise when 
people were not at home (Borsboom, Amstel et al. 2010; Freni, Vicente et al. 2010).  In order to mitigate the 
potential for misuse of geotagged social media content it is important that public awareness is raised regarding 
the privacy and security implications of sharing such data.  To this end, it is hoped that GeoIntelligence will be 
employed as a tool to raise awareness of this issue. 
LIMITATIONS & FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
GeoIntelligence is of course not without limitations.  It relies upon individuals making publically available 
geotagged posts.  While this is becoming increasingly common as social media and location-aware smartphones 
become prevalent, it cannot be seen as representative sample of a population – even amongst the demographics 
where such activities are widespread.  Furthermore, many users only geotag some of their posts to social media 
services, resulting in a data set which could be considered incomplete or inconsistent.  GeoIntelligence can 
therefore not be used to determine information that requires a representative population sample or complete data 
set to be of value. 
The future development of GeoIntelligence tools will be focused on the implementation and optimisation of 
analytical functions.  Current plans for these functions include the ability to identify common daily routes and 
locations, subsequently highlighting deviations from these as items of interest.  Additionally the ability to 
identify relationships between individuals based on locational proximity in a context sensitive manner, for 
example sharing locational proximity at a residential address may have more weighting than a workplace or 
restaurant (Crandall, Backstrom et al. 2010).  The inclusion of additional data sources will assist in achieving 
the aforementioned goals, with reverse geo-coding databases and additional sources of social media information 
the key targets for this integration. 
CONCLUSION 
GeoIntelligence provides a demonstration of the potential value of publically accessible geotagged content from 
social media services.  This potential exists within but is not limited to law enforcement, business intelligence, 
marketing and awareness.  It should be noted however that GeoIntelligence highlights a serious issue in terms of 
the quantity of locational data being published publicly by individuals, as well as the potential for misuse of that 
data. 
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The increase in pervasiveness of locational-aware smartphones, cameras, tablets and laptops has caused a rapid 
increase in the amount of data observable via GeoIntelligence.  As such the value and potential implications of 
misuse of this data have both seen dramatic escalations.  It is important that users evaluate their use of these 
technologies and become aware of the amount of data they are making available. It is hoped that future 
developments in the area of GeoIntelligence is of value to society as a whole, but also helps to educate users of 
social media services as to the implications of sharing locational information. 
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